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1. Introduction and Motivation  
Automated Denial of Information Attacks.  It is a common assumption in event processing that the 
events are “clean”, i.e., they come from well-behaved and trustworthy sources.  This assumption does not 
hold in all major open communications media for several reasons.  First, adversaries may spread massive 
noise data, e.g., in email spam.  Second, adversaries may inject potentially interesting, but obfuscating 
data that distracts the user’s attention, e.g., in honeypot web spam pages.  Third, adversaries may 
introduce purposefully misleading information, e.g., in phishing attacks.  We call these intentional and 
automated attempts to generate and spread noise, obfuscating, and misleading information denial of 
information (DOI) attacks [3][6].  With the continuous advances in information technology, the quality 
and quantity of automatically generated DOI attacks have been increasing exponentially.  In the public 
information area, observed DOI attacks include spam, web spam, and blog spam.  Predicted DOI attacks 
include spit (spam over VoIP) and social network analysis (to be described below).  The automated nature 
of the DOI attacks makes it increasingly difficult, if not impossible, for humans to defend themselves.  
The main hypothesis of this short paper is that we need to create and strengthen automated defense 
techniques and tools to help defuse and mitigate automated DOI attacks. 
Arms Race between DOI Attacks and Defenses.  Typical DOI attacks and defenses are engaged in an 
arms race.  This can be illustrated with the co-evolution of spam messages and automated email filters 
employed by spam victims [1][4].  As spam messages became a serious problem, victims introduced 
keyword filters (Round One) to distinguish spam from legitimate messages.  In response (Round Two), 
the spam producers adopted the misspelling attack (e.g., V1AGtRA), which is very effective against 
keyword filters because a victim's manual specification of keywords is quickly overrun by the automated 
random generation of misspellings.  With the decline of keyword filters, Round Three began with the 
victims’ adoption of statistical learning filters (e.g., Naïve Bayes), which were initially very effective.  In 
response to learning filters (Round Four), spam producers introduced camouflaged content into their 
spam messages, which now contain both spam content and legitimate-looking camouflage designed 
specifically to trick the learning filters to raise their legitimacy scores.  In response to camouflaged 
content (Round Five), victims have begun using refined learning, a process in which learning filters are 
incrementally trained with camouflaged spam messages.  In response (Round Six), spam producers 
started using software tools to randomize their camouflage content to escape refined learning filters.  The 
last 4 rounds constitute an example of the adversarial learning research area.   
Potential Solutions for Adversarial Learning in DOI Defenses.  Adversarial learning is a special kind 
of statistical learning, where the training data is under the influence of an adversary.  The general problem 
of adversarial learning leads to an endless arms race, where game theory can be applied.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, we have found an interesting solution [4] to the arms race between spam producers and 
victims by exploiting the asymmetry between spam messages and legitimate messages.  We observed that 
typical legitimate messages do not contain “strong spam” tokens (e.g., misspellings of VIAGRA) that 
only appear in spam messages, whether they are camouflaged or not.  Our main result is a training 
strategy (that works for Naive Bayes, SVM, and LogitBoost) that generates camouflage-resistant filters 
without retraining.  The ongoing research applies similar ideas (and new ideas) to other adversarial 




learning problems in the DOI arms race that we discuss below.  These solutions that help DOI defenses 
“win” the arms race will bring significant breakthroughs in the area. 
Deceptive Information Detection.  Another major challenge posed by DOI attacks is the difficulty of 
distinguishing deceptive information from legitimate information, particularly when the deception is 
hidden in camouflage data, typically copied from previously proven legitimate information.  Although the 
problem of human deception involves psychological and non-technical issues, automated DOI attacks 
present opportunities for defensive techniques that explore the static aspects of automated DOI attacks 
due to their programming.  The solution to adversarial learning [4] illustrates this possibility.   
Development of New DOI Defenses.  We divide the DOI attacks into two groups: observed DOI attacks 
such as spam, web spam, and blogs; and expected DOI attacks such as spam through VoIP and Social 
Phishing [10].  As a concrete example, our experience working with observed DOI attacks such as email 
shows the limitations of text processing alone.  In the following, we outline some existing methods for 
defending against DOI attacks.  Then we outline an approach that combines several DOI defense 
mechanisms (e.g., learning filters and URL analysis) for observed DOI attacks and evaluate their efficacy.  
Another example of useful combination is to implement multiple DOI defense mechanisms (e.g., learning 
filters) further down into system and network protocol stack [8].  We also outline a second approach to 
develop new defenses against theoretical DOI attacks and evaluate their efficiency.   
Systematic Evaluation of Automated DOI Defenses.  One of the fundamental questions in automated 
DOI defense techniques is the evaluation method that demonstrates the superiority of that defense.  For 
example, past evaluations of spam filters have compared their performance against manual inspection, 
which has limited the scale of those evaluations to a few thousands of messages.  Since one of the main 
goals of developing automated defense mechanisms, manual evaluation methods are clearly not scalable.  
In comparison, we have advocated the use of large corpora (on the order of half a million messages) for 
more reproducible and automated evaluations [5].  We also have applied our knowledge on spam email to 
form a collection of about 300,000 web spam pages [2] for web spam research.  We continue to contribute 
to the development of a systematic and reproducible evaluation method, including the publicly available 
large corpora as shared resources, on adversarial learning in particular and DOI research in general.  
Furthermore, we are applying evaluation methods inspired by scientific research to evaluate the 
effectiveness of DOI defenses.  For example, a recent paper [1] described the initial results of evaluating 
the effectiveness of individual spam filtering techniques through an evolutionary study of specific 
spamicity tests as “genetic markers”.  This study covers 3 years (1/2003 through 12/2005) of spam 
messages, observing what tests worked (causing the spam messages containing it to go extinct) and what 
tests have limited effectiveness (with a significant percentage of spam messages containing it to survive).   
 
2. An Informal Analysis of DOI Attacks and Defenses 
2.1. DOI Attacks 
Problem Description.  We first introduced the DOI problem as an information analog of the well known 
denial of service (DOS) problem.  We note that we are interested in DOI problems that are information-
centric.  For example, we leave it to the DOS researchers to handle DOS attacks on information services.  
As mentioned in the previous section, we are primarily interested in DOI attacks that spread massive 
noise, inject obfuscating and distracting data, or introduce disinformation into information sources, 
usually without shutting down the information service.  As a concrete example, consider the most recent 
report (2005Q4, published in 3/2006) of the Messaging Anti-Abuse Working Group (MAAWG), which 
includes most of major ISPs (Internet Service Providers).  The report summarizes the email processing of 
127M mailboxes, with 142.5 Billion emails blocked or tagged, and 36.6 Billion emails delivered.  This 
report shows about 80% of email traffic to be spam filtered out before they reach the destination servers.  
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Even with this massive filtering, most users are seeing an increasing amount of spam in their mailbox that 
succeeded in passing all the filters along the way. 
Observed DOI Attacks.  In this short paper, we focus on DOI attacks that are automatically generated, 
with email spam as the first example of concrete DOI attacks seen in the real world.  Other growing DOI 
attacks include web spam, with about 20% of crawled pages with content considered to be web spam 
currently.  Another well known growing DOI attack is blog spam, with almost all of the publicly 
writeable blogs being affected by some kind of automated spamming attack.  Due to the automated nature 
of DOI attacks, effective defense mechanisms need to automate its own learning mechanism, so the 
defense can adapt automatically to the easy randomization incorporated into most of DOI attacks.  
Consequently, statistical machine learning methods have been increasingly adopted in the defense against 
DOI attacks.  One common characteristic of these observed DOI attacks is the presence of adversarial 
learning, an arms race between the spammer and the victim (target) of the spam data. In the arms race, the 
attack and defense mechanisms co-evolve to compensate for the new capabilities acquired during the 
learning process.  Other recent examples of DOI attacks include the work on misleading worm signature 
generators [7] and intrusion techniques that attempt to remain below the detection threshold of Intrusion 
Detection Systems.   
Theoretical (Predicted) DOI Attacks.  In many information flow applications we can hypothesize the 
possibility of DOI attacks.  For example, in sensor networks, an adversary might acquire control of some 
sensors and make them produce misleading information.  Another example of generally considered 
impending DOI attack is spam through VoIP (voice over IP) protocols.  Anecdotally, the possibility of 
using software to automatically send DOI attack packets through VoIP seems quite easy and real.  There 
are also attempts to refine some of the previously known DOI attacks.  For example, email spammers 
have been incorporating legitimate content into spam messages in an attempt to confuse the learning 
filters.  Another example of sophisticated spam email consists of “phishing” messages that attempt to 
mimic legitimate emails from a reputable company such as PayPal.  One example of refined DOI attacks 
is the recent research at Indiana University entitled “Social Phishing”, which gathered and used social 
network information to produce more convincing phishing messages than the current generation of 
“canned” phishing email, which are relatively easy to recognize through current generation of learning 
filters.  Another interesting area of research is collaborative filtering, which is itself vulnerable to DOI 
attacks.  One can easily imagine the adversary trying to sign on as a group and inject misleading 
information into the collaborative filter.  Due to the apparent group effort, the confusion establishes itself 
relatively quickly. 
2.2. Example DOI Defenses 
Previous Results.  Significant progress has been made in developing automated defense techniques for 
several concrete DOI attacks.  The first example is spam filter evaluation, including a case for large 
corpora-based quantitative evaluation method [5], a solution for adversarial learning in resisting 
camouflage attacks [4], a study of spam construction technique evolution [1], and integration of diverse 
spam filtering techniques [3].  The second example is web spam [2].  The third example of DOI research 
is automated worm signature generator [7].  The fourth example is the efficient implementation of spam 
filters using Bloom filters [8].  The fifth example is the resistance against collusions in trust management 
[9].  We include a sample of these results for illustration. 
Case Study of DOI Defense: Resistance to Camouflage Attacks [4].  Although learning filters such as 
Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machines, and LogitBoost have been shown to be effective in classifying 
spam, they are vulnerable to camouflage attacks that add legitimate content/tokens to a spam message.  
Retraining these filters to recognize the camouflage attack tokens is only temporarily effective because 
new (randomized) camouflage content can still pass by the retrained filters.  On surface, this “`arms race’’ 
between camouflage spam messages and retraining of filters never ends, since the retraining is always in 
response to new and unpredictable camouflage content.  Instead of retraining, we adopted a new design 
for learning filters to counter camouflage attack.  The new design differs from the current generation of 
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learning filters (with equal number of legitimate and spam tokens used in training phase) in two ways.  
First, it decreases the filter sensitivity to legitimate content by limiting the number of legitimate features 
used in training (e.g., 25 tokens).  Second, our design increases the filter sensitivity to spam content by 
increasing the number of spam features used in training (e.g., 9000 tokens).  As a result, our new filters 
are able to detect spam messages with any camouflage content, without the need for retraining.   
Case Study of DOI Defense: Evolution of Spam Construction [1]: We collected monthly data from 
SpamArchive over a three year period (from January 2003 through December 2005), accumulating more 
than 1.4M messages.  Then, we conducted an evolutionary study by running 497 spamicity tests from 
SpamAssassin on each month.  The population of messages testing positive for each spamicity test 
indicates the adoption of the spam construction technique associated with that spamicity test.  This paper 
focuses on two evolutionary trends in our population study: extinction, where the population dwindles to 
zero or near zero, and co-existence, where the population maintains a consistent level or even grows, 
despite attempts by spamicity tests to eliminate it.  We divide the factors that lead to extinction or co-
existence into three groups: environmental changes, individual filtering, and collaborative filtering.  We 
observed evidence of extinction (e.g., HTML-based obfuscation techniques), and somewhat 
unexpectedly, we observed evidence of co-existence between spam messages containing construction 
techniques and spamicity tests in filters (e.g., block list collaborative filtering). 
Case Study of DOI Defense: Webb Spam Corpus [2].  Just as email spam has negatively impacted the 
user messaging experience, the rise of Web spam is threatening to severely degrade the quality of 
information on the World Wide Web. Fundamentally, Web spam is designed to pollute search engines 
and corrupt the user experience by driving traffic to particular spammed Web pages, regardless of the 
merits of those pages.  We identify an interesting link between email spam and Web spam, and we use 
this link to demonstrate a novel technique for extracting large Web spam samples from the Web. Then, 
we present the Webb Spam Corpus (a first-of-its-kind, large-scale, and publicly available Web spam data 
set that was created using our automated Web spam collection method. The corpus consists of nearly 
350,000 Web spam pages, making it more than two orders of magnitude larger than any other previously 
cited Web spam data set. Finally, we identify several application areas where the Webb Spam Corpus 
may be especially helpful. Interestingly, since the Webb Spam Corpus bridges the worlds of email spam 
and Web spam, we note that it can be used to aid traditional email spam classification algorithms through 
an analysis of the characteristics of the Web pages referenced by email messages. 
Case Study of DOI Attack: Misleading Worm Signature Generators [7]: Several syntactic-based 
automatic worm signature generators, e.g., Polygraph, have recently been proposed.  These systems 
typically assume that a set of suspicious flows are provided by a flow classifier, e.g., a honeynet or an 
intrusion detection system, that often introduces “noise” due to difficulties and imprecision in flow 
classification. The algorithms for extracting the worm signatures from the flow data are designed to cope 
with the noise. It has been reported that these systems can handle a fairly high noise level, e.g., 80% for 
Polygraph. In this paper, we show that if noise is introduced deliberately to mislead a worm signature 
generator, a much lower noise level, e.g., 50%, can already prevent the system from reliably generating 
useful worm signatures. We describe a new and general class of attacks whereby a worm can combine 
polymorphism and misleading behavior to intentionally pollute the dataset of suspicious flows during its 
propagation and successfully mislead the automatic signature generation process. This study suggests that 
unless an accurate and robust flow classification process is in place, automatic syntactic-based signature 
generators are vulnerable to such noise injection attacks. 
Case Study of DOI Defense: TrustGuard [9].  Reputation systems have been popular in estimating the 
trustworthiness and predicting the future behavior of nodes in a large-scale distributed system where 
nodes may transact with one another without prior knowledge or experience. One of the fundamental 
challenges in distributed reputation management is to understand vulnerabilities and develop mechanisms 
that can minimize the potential damages to a system by malicious nodes.  We identify three 
vulnerabilities that are detrimental to decentralized reputation management and propose the TrustGuard 
safeguard framework. First, we provide a dependable trust model and a set of formal methods to handle 
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strategic malicious nodes that continuously change their behavior to gain unfair advantages in the system. 
Second, a transaction based reputation system handles malicious nodes that produce flooding feedbacks 
with fake transactions.  Third, we filter out dishonest feedback inserted by malicious nodes through 
collusion. Our experiments show that, comparing with existing reputation systems, our framework is 
highly dependable and effective in countering malicious nodes regarding strategic oscillating behavior, 
flooding malevolent feedbacks with fake transactions, and dishonest feedbacks. 
 
3. Approaches to DOI Defenses 
Analysis of Automated Defenses for Observed DOI Attacks.  For short term deliverables, we will 
continue to develop DOI defense techniques for observed DOI attacks such as spam, web spam, blog, 
automated worm signature generators, and efficient spam filter implementation.  Some of these efforts 
will build on and complement the research results summarized under the “Case Study of DOI” label 
above.  For example, the combination of multiple spam filtering techniques to improve the efficiency of 
spam filtering can produce quick and positive results.  Another example is the combination of trust 
management with collaborative filtering, since we need to improve the precision of collaborative filtering 
through the discovery of colluding parties, just as the web spam researchers have found.  Some other 
efforts in this thrust will apply known techniques to new areas, similar to applying email spam filtering 
results to distinguish web spam pages.  An example of a new effort in this area would apply email spam 
and web spam results to combat automated blog spam. 
Automated Defenses for Theoretical DOI Attacks.  To achieve revolutionary advances in this research, 
we will develop new DOI defense techniques for predicted DOI attacks that may not have become 
popular.  Given our reliance on large public corpora collected from real attacks (see the Evaluation 
section), it is non-trivial to demonstrate the effectiveness of our defense mechanisms quantitatively.  We 
are designing new defense mechanisms for these predicted DOI attack areas in coordination with the 
development of synthetic corpora that contain the predicted attacks such as spam over VoIP and social 
phishing.  Another interesting example of theoretical DOI attacks is the targeted false positive attack, 
where targeted legitimate content (e.g., official email from a competing company) is sent with strong 
spam tokens (a reverse camouflage), so the targeted content become tainted in many spam filters by 
association through the normal incremental learning process.  Consequently, the targeted content will 
receive high spamicity scores and be filtered out in many stages of email transmission.  This attack is 
particularly important for intelligence applications, since it is useful in the hiding of targeted content from 
human users.  We will apply our experience and results from Research Thrust 1 on observed DOI attacks, 
including the quantity and variety of corpora content needed for reproducible experiments.   
Example Applications.  An important task in mission-critical enterprise applications is the continuous 
integration of new information from various information sources.  This task is particularly important and 
challenging for sensors that generate up-to-date information about the real world (called live information).  
Live information is characterized by three properties.  First, live information is new information 
originated from sensors connected either to the real world (e.g., real-time sensor data) or to an artificial 
world (e.g., simulations or human analysis).  In both cases, the sensors detect situations or measure 
variables that may lead to complex events that are difficult to predict, e.g., indications of an impending 
terrorist attack.  Second, live information is perishable, with value that decays with time, e.g., the 
information on a planned terrorist attack becomes less valuable after the attack has occurred.  Third, live 
information must be delivered in ways that preserve broad metrics of quality, including consistency, 
reliability, and security.  For mission-critical applications, reliability and security are paramount.  A 
demonstration application, Live Information Integration, consists of an information flow connecting many 
components, starting from sensors that capture and transmit new information, through intermediate 
selection, filtering, and combination processes, to real-time event detection programs and backend 
database servers that store the information for further analysis.  This application is highly dynamic, 
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evolving with many sensors joining and leaving the system.  It also has a highly variable workload, since 
the information volume gathered by the sensors varies according to external stimulus.   
Example Application of DOI Defenses.  Live information sources are inherently vulnerable to DOI 
attacks.  For example, sensor networks can easily allow DOI attacks when the adversary hijacks some of 
the sensors, making them produce noise, obfuscating or distracting information, or disinformation.  Our 
hypothesis is that currently known DOI defense techniques and tools may be effective in related 
application areas.  For example, the solution to adversarial learning in camouflaged email spam may be 
applicable to distinguish camouflage sources (that produce misleading data in addition to legitimate data) 
from legitimate sources in other areas such as sensors, in addition to the identification of phishing 
messages and social phishing messages.  Although these are clearly very difficult problems if we only 
applied text filtering, we may be able to find better solutions through the integration of multiple spam 
filtering techniques [3] that combines statistical learning filters and semantic interpretation of email 
content, e.g., URLs.   
 
4. Evaluation Approach 
Systematic Evaluation of Automated DOI Defenses.  One of the fundamental questions in automated 
DOI defense techniques is the evaluation method that demonstrates the superiority of that defense.  For 
example, past evaluations of spam filters have compared their performance against manual inspection.  
Although manual inspection of emails is considered the “golden standard” without errors, it has inherent 
limitations (of up to a few thousands of messages) on the scale of those experiments to the evaluations.  In 
comparison, we have advocated the use of large corpora (on the order of half a million messages) since 
we have found that evaluations done with smaller corpora yield large variances in experimental results 
[5].  Using published small corpora, repeating the same experiments results in false positives ranging 
from 0% to 46% and false negatives ranging from 3% to 96%.  For researchers in traditional machine 
learning areas such as speech recognition, the need for large corpora used in reproducible and comparable 
experiments would be unsurprising, since they have reached consensus for such need in early 90’s.   
Evaluation Method and Infrastructure.  The large corpora used in our email experiments, the 
SpamArchive for confirmed spam messages and the Enron Corpus for legitimate messages, are in public 
domain.  However, our study on the evolution of spam construction techniques [1] shows the need for 
maintaining updated large corpora for consistent evaluations of spam filters.  Recent glitches in the 
volunteer-supported SpamArchive collection resulted in gaps during early 2006, showing the need for 
alternative public large collections.  We have started such an effort in the collection of a large web spam 
corpus of about 350,000 web spam pages [2], the first of its kind to the best of our knowledge.  In this 
work, we applied our experience and knowledge on spam email filtering to the web spam area.  By 
assuming a connection between spam messages and web spam, we used URLs contained in spam 
messages to accumulate a corpus of web spam documents to support future web spam research that can 
evaluate their algorithms on published large corpora.  This research will continue to contribute to the 
development of a systematic and reproducible evaluation method, including the publicly available large 
corpora as shared resources, on adversarial learning in particular and DOI research in general.   
Evaluation of Theoretical DOI Attacks.  Part of the revolutionary advance in this research is the 
development of infrastructure and methods to evaluate the defense mechanisms developed for theoretical 
(predicted) DOI attacks such as spam over VoIP, targeted false positive attacks, and social network 
analysis attacks mentioned above.  We anticipate the need for evaluation methods beyond traditional 
evaluation methods based on precision and recall.  For example, our evolutionary study [1] shows some 
unexpected results of an observation-based study of spam construction techniques that is orthogonal to 
statistical learning.  For example, collaborative filtering has been able to identify known “bad” URLs and 
put them into blacklists such as WS.SURBL.ORG, about 60% of spam messages continue to carry such 
URLs, despite their presence in the blacklists.  There are two efforts on the evaluation of defense 
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mechanism to handle theoretical DOI attacks predicted by our research.  One is on the construction of 
reasonable collections for evaluation before the real attacks start, a capability that would allow us to 
evaluate the defense mechanisms effectively and preemptively.  The other is the design of novel 
evaluation methods such as the evolutionary study [1]. 
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